We study the problem of "privacy amplification": key agreement between two parties who both know a weak secret w, such as a password. (Such a setting is ubiquitous on the internet, where passwords are the most commonly used security device.) We assume that the key agreement protocol is taking place in the presence of an active computationally unbounded adversary Eve. The adversary may have partial knowledge about w, so we assume only that w has some entropy from Eve's point of view. Thus, the goal of the protocol is to convert this nonuniform secret w into a uniformly distributed string R that is fully secret from Eve. R may then be used as a key for running symmetric cryptographic protocols (such as encryption, authentication, etc.).
INTRODUCTION
The classical problem of privacy amplification, introduced by Bennett et al. [1988] , considers the setting in which two parties, Alice and Bob, start out knowing a common string w that is partially secret. Following Bennett et al. [1995] , we make no assumption on the distribution of w beyond a lower bound on its entropy. The goal of Alice and Bob is to perform key agreement: to agree on a string R that is fully secret. Formally, R should be statistically close to uniform from the point of view of the adversary Eve (we will let 2 −κ be the statistical distance between the distribution of R and the uniform distribution, and call κ the security parameter). Such R can then be used as a key for symmetric cryptography.
We make no computational assumptions and therefore model Eve as being computationally unbounded. This requirement implies that all the entropy in R comes from w. Thus, one of the most important requirements of such a protocol is that the output length of R must be as long as possible given the entropy of w. The difference between the entropy of w and the length of R is called the entropy loss.
We can model the communication channel between Alice and Bob as authenticated or unsecured. Equivalently, we can model Eve as passive or active. If Eve is passive (i.e., merely listens in on the messages between Alice and Bob but cannot modify them), strong extractors [Nisan and Zuckerman 1996] provide an optimal solution to this problem. Alice simply sends an extractor seed to Bob, they both extract R from w using the seed, and the entropy loss can be as low as 2κ.
However, if Eve is active (i.e., can modify the messages), the problem becomes considerably harder. In particular, one needs to worry not only about achieving R that is 2 −κ -close to uniform, but also about ensuring that Alice and Bob output the same R with probability at least 1 − 2 −κ . While the specific focus of our paper is to obtain R of maximum length, there are other parameters that one might wish to optimize. For instance, one might wish to minimize the round complexity or to minimize the entropy required in w for the protocol to work. Renner and Wolf [2003] , building on a series of works by Maurer, Renner and Wolf [Maurer 1997; Maurer and Wolf 1997, 2003; Wolf 1998 ], presented the first protocol that is secure against active Eve and works even when w is less than half-entropic (i.e., h W ≤ λ w /2 where h W and λ w denote the entropy and the length of w). Moreover, by the use of extractors with asymptotically optimal seed length [Guruswami et al. 2007] and through the analysis of Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , it can be seen that the protocol of Renner and Wolf [2003] achieves entropy loss of (κ 2 ) and takes (κ) rounds of communication. (The work of Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , which builds upon Renner and Wolf [2003] , achieves the same asymptotic parameters but considerably improves the constants hidden inside by eliminating the need for complicated extractors.) Dodis and Wichs [2009] reduce the number of messages in the protocol from (k) to just 2, but do not improve the entropy loss. They also present a two-message nonconstructive (in other words, nonpolynomial-time) protocol with an entropy loss of (κ). (They achieve this result by introducing a primitive called nonmalleable extractors and showing nonconstructively that they exist.) While this result shows the theoretical feasibility of achieving such a low entropy loss, the only efficient solution that matches this entropy loss relies on Random Oracles [Boyen et al. 2005 ]-that is, an "assumption" that a publicly known truly random function is available. (It should be noted that single-message protocols for the same problem exist [Maurer and Wolf 1997; Dodis et al. 2012] ; however, they have entropy loss λ w − h W + (κ) and thus require w to be at least half-entropic.)
Achieving an efficient privacy amplification protocol with entropy loss (κ) and without resorting to the Random Oracle Model has, until now, been an open question.
Our Contribution. We construct the first efficient protocol for privacy amplification over unsecured channels whose entropy loss (and number of rounds) is linear in the security parameter κ. This security loss is optimal up to constant factors, because extractor bounds require entropy loss at least 2κ − O(1) even in the case of authenticated channels [Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma 2000 ]. We thus demonstrate that, up to constant factors, privacy amplification over unsecured channels can be as entropy-efficient as over authenticated ones.
Extension to Information Reconciliation/Fuzzy Extractors. Consider the following generalization: Alice starts out with w, but Bob starts out with w that is close to w in some metric space. Their goal is still the same: to agree on the same uniform string R. This problem is known as privacy amplification with information reconciliation [Bennett et al. 1988] or as fuzzy extractors [Dodis et al. 2008] . Constructions secure against active Eve appeared in Dodis and Wichs [2009] , Dodis et al. [2012] , Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , and Renner and Wolf [2004] .
This setting arises, for example, when Alice and Bob have access to a (possibly) noisy channel that can be partially eavesdropped by Eve; or when a trusted server (Alice) stores the biometric of a user (Bob), and the user subsequently uses his fresh biometric reading to authenticate himself to the server; or when Alice and Bob are mobile nodes wanting to authenticate each other based on the fact that their knowledge of a location is greater than Eve's (e.g., if they are much closer to a particular location than Eve, and thus are able to observe it at higher resolution).
Using the same approach as in [Kanukurthi and Reyzin 2009] , our protocol extends to this setting, as well. Problem. Ishai et al. [2009] consider the problem of constructing a twoparty protocol that extracts m "clean" instances of a joint distribution (X, Y) from O(m) "dirty" instances. This task can be viewed as a generalization of randomness extraction (the special case is when X and Y are identical bits). However, the techniques of Ishai et al. [2009] do not directly apply to the case when we have only one instance of a distribution. Furthermore, the entropy loss achieved in their work is significantly greater (constant factor times m) than in our case, where we obtain an entropy loss which is independent of the entropy or length of the secret and linear in the security parameter.
A Related
Construction Techniques. Our starting point is the protocol for interactive authentication from Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , which generalizes the authentication protocol of Renner and Wolf [2003] . We focus only on the case when Alice and Bob share the same secret w; that is, when w = w (as mentioned, the more general case can be addressed in the exact same way as in Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] ). Using known techniques from the works of Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , it suffices to construct a message authentication protocol that can authentically transfer a message m from Alice to Bob using w.
The authentication protocol of Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] works by authenticating bits of m one by one. For each bit of m, Bob sends Alice a random extractor seed, and, if the bit is equal to 1, Alice responds with the output of the extractor on input w using Bob's seed. Alice also sends Bob a random extractor seed of her own, to which he always responds (applying the extractor to w using Alice's seed), regardless of the bit of m. Each extractor output is κ bits long. This results in (κ) entropy loss for every bit authenticated, and (κ 2 ) entropy loss overall, because the message being authenticated needs to be (κ) bits long (it is, actually, a MAC key in the protocol of Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] ). The security proof shows that to succeed in breaking such an authentication protocol, the active adversary Eve must respond to at least one fresh random challenge on her own without interacting with either Alice or Bob. Because the extractor output is a nearly uniform κ-bit string, Eve cannot succeed with probability much higher than 2 −κ .
The high-level intuition for our protocol is as follows. If we were to shorten the length of the extractor output (in the authentication protocol) to be a constant number of bits, then we only lose (1) bits of entropy for every bit of m and obtain an (κ) entropy loss overall. On the other hand, the success probability of an adversary is a constant (by the same proof as before). If we could instead now ensure that Eve must respond to several (namely, (κ)) fresh random challenges on her own, then we could show that the success probability is 2 −κ . This can be done by encoding m in a special errordetecting code of distance (κ) and ensuring that to introduce (κ) errors required to avoid detection, Eve must come up with (κ) extractor outputs on her own.
It turns out that the code we need is a code for the edit distance [Levenshtein 1966 ] (the distance that counts the number of single-character insertions and deletions required to convert one string into another), for the following reasons. We observe that, since the authentication of m is done bit-by-bit, Eve can change m by inserting individual bits, deleting them, or changing them from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. Deletions, insertions of 1, and changes from 0 to 1 require Eve to guess an extractor output on a fresh random seed. Thus, Eve can create edit errors in the message, but at least some types of the edit errors (namely, insertions of 1 and deletions) require her to find an extractor output on her own. Because in the context of Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , the length of m and the number of 1s in it are known a priori to both Alice and Bob, insertions of 0 and changes of 1 to 0 must be accompanied by deletions and changes of 0 to 1; in fact, we show that, no matter how Eve chooses to modify the string, at least a quarter of the operations require her to find an extractor output on her own. So, if instead of authenticating the bits of the m, Alice first encoded m in an error-detecting code for 4κ edit errors, Eve would have to respond to at least κ fresh random challenges on her own. Of course, the length of the codeword must still remain linear in the length of m. The codes of Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] have this property (though we need to modify them to ensure the number of 1s is the same for every codeword of a given length).
Proof Techniques. While using an error-detecting code and shortening the extractor outputs intuitively may seem to work in a straightforward manner, the proofs turn out to be quite tricky. In particular, we will need to use a proof technique that is completely different from the one used in Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , for the following reason. In the authentication protocols of Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , Alice authenticates bits of the message one at a time. The proofs make use of induction on the length of the message received so far by Bob to show that if Eve was successful in changing any bit(s) of the message, then Eve must have responded to one fresh random challenge on her own. We, on the other hand, cannot use such an induction argument since we need to precisely characterize how many fresh random challenges Eve must have responded in relation to the number of bits modified. Instead, we use a new proof technique wherein we view the entire protocol transcript from the point of view of Eve as a string of literals, where each literal represent an interaction either with Alice or Bob. Using combinatorial arguments, we show that Eve cannot interleave these literals to her advantage without having to respond to many fresh random challenges.
Next, one might like to claim that if Eve were to respond with multiple extractor outputs for random, independent seeds, then her success in giving the right response for each of the seeds is also independent of her success for other seeds. Unfortunately, this intuition does not quite hold and there are subtleties in proving the theorem in this manner. We could try to use average min-entropy (introduced in Dodis et al. [2008] ), which gives us a guarantee that on average the entropy in w does not get reduced by too much, and implies the desired bound on the probability that Eve is successful in a single fresh random challenge. However, if the min-entropy in a particular run is below average, then Eve has an easier task for all fresh random random challenge simultaneously. In an extreme case, here may be a particular bad run (which occurs with very small probability) in which all information about w is revealed. This, in turn, destroys all independence in the events of Eve's success for each challenge. To counter this, we take the approach of considering two separate cases-the case when the run does not reveal too much about w and where we can argue "sufficient independence" (which happens with high probability), and the case when the run might reveal too much about w (perhaps all of it) and we cannot argue independence (which happens with low probability). Now, if we make an assumption that w begins with (κ) bits of entropy more than what would be needed otherwise, we can show that the probability with which independence does not hold is low enough for our theorem to be true.
Organization of This Article. We introduce notation and define our security model in Section 2. In Section 3, we briefly describe some of the existing tools that we require for our construction. Our main construction is given in Section 4. We give the proof of our main theorem in 5.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Let U l denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1} l . Let X 1 , X 2 be two probability distributions over some set S. Their statistical distance is
(they are said to be ε- Dodis et al. 2008] as
(here the expectation is taken over e for which Pr[ E = e] is nonzero). A computationally unbounded adversary who receives the value of E cannot give the correct value of W (in a single attempt) with probability greater than 2 − H ∞ (W|E) . Throughout this article, for any string x, we use the notation λ x to denote its length and h x to denote its entropy (i.e, H ∞ (X)). We make use of the following lemma [Dodis et al. 2008, Lemma 2.2b] , which states that the average min-entropy of a variable from the point of view of an adversary does not decrease by more than the number of bits (correlated with the variable) observed by the adversary. 
We also use the following lemma [Dodis et al. 2008, Lemma 2.2a] , which says that min-entropy is t bits less than the average min-entropy with probability at most 2 −t . LEMMA 2.2. For any δ > 0, the conditional entropy In a Privacy Amplification Protocol, the outputs of Alice and Bob will be denoted by k A = A(w, received a , r a ) and k B = B(w, received b , r b ). Each of k A and k B can be either a key or a special symbol ⊥, signifying that the party has detected an active attack and is aborting the protocol.
Before formally defining security, let us explain the reasoning behind the definition. We would like for the outputs of Alice and Bob to match. However, this goal is unachievable in general [Maurer 1997 ]: Eve could simply interfere with the last message of the protocol to force the recipient of that message to reject while the sender will accept (this is assuming the last message influences the recipient's accept/reject decision; if not, the same argument could be made using the last message that does). Instead, we will make a weaker requirement: with high probability, k A = k B or k A = ⊥ or k B = ⊥ (a more strict, asymmetric definition is also possible: it could require, for example, that k A = k B or k B = ⊥, ensuring that if Alice detects a problem, then Bob does, too; it may make sense if Alice makes her accept/reject decision before Bob).
We would also like for the keys output by Alice and Bob to be (nearly) random. Let us focus on Alice's key k A . We could ask for distribution of k A | k A = ⊥ to be close to uniform, but that definition seems unachievable, because Eve could disrupt the protocol unless she is confident that k A is in a small set of possible values, in which case k A | k A = ⊥ is far from uniform, simply because k A = ⊥ is very rare and k A is constrained in such a case. 1 The problem comes from trying to condition on rare events; indeed, if k A = ⊥ is very rare, then we shouldn't care about the marginal distribution of k A in this rare case. This problem could be solved by requiring that the product of Pr[ k A = ⊥] and distance of k A | k A = ⊥ from uniform be small. For aesthetic reasons, we prefer to solve it differently: we follow the approach of Dodis et al. [2011, Section 6] , and compare the distribution of k A to the distribution that is ⊥ with the same probability as Pr[ k A =⊥], and is uniform otherwise. We note that this problem does not come 
(Note that this is pre-application robustness in the terminology of Dodis et al. [2011 Dodis et al. [ , 2012 ; we do not address post-application robustness here.) (3) Extraction. Define purify(r) to be a randomized function whose input is either a binary string or ⊥. If r = ⊥, then purify(r) = ⊥; else, purify(r) is a uniformly chosen random string of lentgh λ k . Note that the pair Sent = (Sent a , Sent b ) contains an active Eve's view of the protocol. We require that for any Eve,
The quantity h W − λ k is the known as the entropy loss of the protocol. We can allow Eve to additionally have some information on the secret w, sampled as a random variable E that is correlated with W. We avoided introducing it above to simplify notation; to add it in, require that robustness holds even when Eve is given this additional information, and include E into Sent for defining extraction. Of course, the definition is required to hold only when
An important building block that we will construct is an interactive authentication protocol. In an authentication protocol, both Alice and Bob have the same input w as in the privacy amplification protocol, and Alice additionally takes as input a message m that she wants to send to Bob authentically. The goal is merely to transmit this message, not to agree on a key. We let m a denote the message that Alice is trying to send and m b denote the message that Bob receives. Each party has an output, denoted by t A and t B , that is "accept" or "reject"; additionally, Bob outputs m b . We stress that m b is determined by the protocol transcript which, in turn, is controlled by an adaptive adversary. We now present the formal definition. (The definition we use is just an interactive variant of one-time message authentication codes. See Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009, Definition 4] Similarly to Definition 2.3, in this definition we can also allow Eve to have some information on the secret w by simply giving this information as input to Eve.
We note that in this definition, asymmetry is essential: it is not enough that Alice outputs "reject" when m a = m b , because if Bob doesn't detect that he got the wrong message, he may mistakenly rely on it in subsequent steps (e.g., if the message is an extractor seed, and Eve manages to tamper with it without being detected by Bob, then Bob may extract a key that has no secrecy, and Eve will be able to read any messages he encrypts with that key). In contrast, since Alice is the one sending m a , she knows the correct message even if Eve tampers with the protocol and is not detected by Alice.
For the sake of simplicity, we might omit t A , t B from the outputs of Alice and Bob when it is clear from context what values they take (generally, "accept" if all checks in the protocol are satisfied, and "reject" otherwise).
BUILDING BLOCKS
We begin by presenting the building blocks needed for our main construction of a privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss.
Extractors
Extractors [Nisan and Zuckerman 1996] yield a close-to-uniform string from a random variable with high min-entropy, using a uniformly random seed i as a kind of catalyst. Strong extractors are ones in which the extracted string looks random even in the presence of the seed. We will use only strong extractors in this article and thus sometimes omit the adjective "strong."
Definition 3.1. Let Ext : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l be a polynomial-time probabilistic function that uses r bits of randomness. We say that Ext is an (n, t, l, ε)-strong extractor if for all random variables W over {0,
Universal hash functions are perhaps the simplest extractors, allowing t = − 2 + 2 log 1 ε (see Stinson [2002, Theorem 8 .1]; Håstad et al. [1999, Lemma 4.8] , and references therein).
If an extractor works when the guarantee on W is for conditional min-entropy rather than min-entropy, it is called an average-case extractor. This notation was introduced in Dodis et al. [2008, Section 2.5] . Vadhan [2012, Problem 6.8] showed that all extractors are average-case extractors with a slight loss of parameters: namely, any (t, ε)-extractor for t ≤ n − 1 is also a (t, 3ε)-average-case extractor. Some extractors-namely, universal hash function [Carter and Wegman 1979] -don't lose parameters at all in the average case [Dodis et al. 2008 , Section 2.5] (in fact, almost universal hash functions [Stinson 2002 ] work as well [Dodis et al. 2012] ).
For the purposes of this work, we would like to argue that extractor outputs are hard to predict for an adversary. We first recall the following lemma [Kanukurthi and Reyzin 2009 , Lemma 1] on the average entropy of extractor outputs. LEMMA 3.2. Let Ext be a (n, t, , ε)-strong extractor and W be a random variable over {0, 1} n with
This lemma says that (assuming log 1 ε > ) an −bit extractor output has an entropy of − 1 bits on average, over all seeds; this implies that it cannot be predicted with probability higher than 2 −1 . In this work, we will sometimes require a stronger guarantee. We will require that the probability, for a random seed, that an extractor output has entropy less than − 1 is low. If we tried to use the bound on the average entropy of Ext(W; X) | X to directly obtain a bound on the real entropy of Ext(W; X)|X = x (for instance, by using the Markov's inequality), we get that
This quantity is too high when δ is low. We show in the next lemma that we can obtain a tighter bound for the case when the extractor output is short. LEMMA 3.3. Let Ext be a (n, t, , ε)-strong extractor and W be a random variable over {0, 1} n with
PROOF. For each x let s x denote the extractor output that maximizes Pr
Our goal is determine the maximum probability that x ∈ Bad.
The first line here follows from the definition of an extractor; the rest follows from it by simple probability manipulation and the definition of Bad:
It then follows from here that,
Edit Distance Codes
Codes for insertion and deletion errors were first considered in the work of Levenshtein [1966] . The first polynomial-time encodable and decodable codes that have constant rate and can correct a constant fraction of errors were given by Schulman and Zuckerman in Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] . For our application, we only require the code to be polynomial-time encodable and not necessarily polynomialtime decodable (this will be sufficient to get polynomial-time error detection when m sent in the clear from Alice to Bob, which is all we need). We also add a requirement that all codewords have the same Hamming weight. Let m be a message of length λ m . For any two strings c and c of length λ c , let EditDis(c, c ) denote the edit distance between c and c ; that is, the number of single-bit insert and delete operations required to change string c to c is EditDis(c, c ). Remark. Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] did not have the requirement of fixed Hamming weight, however, such codes can be constructed easily 2 using the same techniques and keeping the rate and the relative distance constant.
Interactive Authentication Protocol
We use the interactive authentication protocol from Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] that Alice and Bob run in order to send bits authentically to each other. Let the security parameter be κ. Let Alice and Bob share an n-bit secret w ∈ W with min-entropy h W . Let the message that Alice wishes to authenticate be m = m 1 . . . m λ m . Assume that Bob knows λ m and the number of ones in m (say wt(m)). Let Ext be a (λ w , t, κ +1, 2 −κ−1 )-strong extractor with seed length q bits. 3 That is, Ext takes seeds of input length q, outputs κ + 1-bit strings that are 2 −κ−1 -close to uniform, as long as the input has sufficient entropy t. (In particular, t ≥ 3κ +1 is sufficient if Ext is a universal hash function.) The authentication protocol from Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] , which is a modification of the scheme from Renner and Wolf [2003] , is presented in the following text. Note that this protocol is simply an interleaving of two processes: Alice is responding to λ m random challenges from Bob, one per message bit, with her response varying depending on the value of the bit. Bob is responding to λ m + 1 challenges from Alice, the same way each time.
Protocol Auth(w, m).
(1) Alice sends Bob a fresh random challenge x 1 ∈ r {0, 1} q (where ∈ r is used to denote choosing uniformly at random). (2) Bob receives x 1 , sends r x 1 = Ext(w; x 1 ), and a fresh random challenge y 1 ∈ r {0, 1} q to Alice. (In this protocol, "Alice/Bob aborts" means she/he sets t A /t B to "reject".) We need the following definition before we can describe the intuition behind the security of this authentication scheme.
Definition 3.6. We say that Eve responded to Alice (Bob) with a fresh random challenge if -Eve received a fresh random challenge x from Alice (Bob) at some time instance t; -At some time instance, t + i, Eve sent Alice (Bob) r such that r = Ext(w; x); -Between the time instance t and t + i, Eve did not receive Ext(w; x ) for any x from either Alice or Bob.
In other words, we say that Eve responded to a fresh random challenge sent by Alice (Bob), if Alice (Bob) sends a challenge and Eve responds to it without having received a response to an extractor challenge (on any, not necessarily the same, seed) in the meantime. (Note that if Eve sends ⊥ in response to Bob's challenge, thereby authenticating a zero bit, it is not considered as a response to a fresh random challenge.) The intuition for the security of this protocol is as follows. Note that Eve can insert a 0 bit (this does not require a response from Alice) and can change a 1 bit to a 0 bit. Since Bob knows λ m as well as wt(m), if Eve were to insert 0 bits or change a 1 bit to a 0, then she must also either remove 0 bits or insert 1 bits. Now, removing 0 bits sent by Alice or inserting 1 bits require responding to a random challenge of Alice or Bob. By Lemma 3.2, we have that the r x i and r y i values have entropy κ from Eve's point of view. Since the responses (r x i and r y i ) have entropy κ bits, Eve cannot respond to a fresh random challenge by Alice or Bob with probability > 2 −κ . Hence, the probability of Eve's success can be shown to be at most 2 −κ .
To analyze the entropy loss in the case of passive Eve (an active Eve can't learn too much more), we note that Bob reveals κ + 1 bits of information correlated to w for each of his λ m + 1 messages to Alice, while Alice reveals κ + 1 bits of information correlated to w for each of her wt(m) messages to Bob in which m i = 1. Therefore, the entropy loss of the authentication protocol is (κ + 1)(λ m + wt(m) + 1) = (λ m κ) by Lemma 2.1. Specifically, we apply Lemma 2.1 where A equals W and B equals all the bits sent by Alice and Bob; the uniformly random extractor seeds sent by Alice and Bob increase H ∞ (A, B) and decrease λ by the same amount, and thus cancel out.
This entropy loss analysis shows that as long as H ∞ (W) ≥ t + (κ + 1)(λ m + wt(m) + 1), (where t is the threshold entropy that is needed by the specific extractor used for the extraction to be secure), the entropy in w is sufficient for the extractor to work until the last round, ensuring that the protocol is secure (this analysis requires an average-case extractor; our analysis later will not have this requirement).
The entropy loss of (λ m κ) in the authentication protocol translates to an entropy loss of (κ 2 ) for the privacy amplification protocol (because the privacy amplification protocol of Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] needs to authenticate a message-namely, a MAC key-of length (κ)).
MAIN CONSTRUCTION
Our main construction of a privacy amplification protocol is obtained by building an improved authentication protocol with low entropy loss. In particular, our main theorem is as follows. 
The protocol is secure as long as h W ≥ 2λ c τ + t + κ + 4 + max(λ c + 3, κ) and κ is sufficiently large (specifically, κ ≥ 4 + τ + log 2 (2λ c + 1)).
We now show why this theorem is sufficient for our result. Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] use a message authentication protocol (in a black-box manner) to obtain a privacy amplification protocol whose entropy loss is the same, up to constant factors, as the entropy loss of the authentication protocol for sending a message m of length λ m = (κ). In this work, we use the improved protocol given by this theorem as a substitute for message authentication protocol Auth used in Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] . This, together with the fact that e A , ρ, and τ are constants, as well as the fact that there exist (n, t, , ε) extractors (such as universal hash functions) for which t = ( + log To obtain a privacy amplification protocol from an authentication protocol, we follow the approach of Renner and Wolf [2003] . Here we provide a very high-level intuition. Alice uses the authentication protocol to authenticate a seed to an extractor, which is then used to extract the final key. Since an extractor seed (x) can be of length κ, using the constant rate codes of Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] , our authentication protocol has entropy loss that is linear in κ. This translates into a privacy amplification protocol with the same entropy loss. There is a subtle challenge in this high-level intuition. The adversary may learn information about the final key by making queries 5 λ c = λ m /ρ, where ρ is a constant by Theorem 3.5. λ m = (κ) and e A is a constant. Hence, τ is a constant. 6 We note that this constraint on κ, which comes from the statement of Theorem 4.1, is very minor. Indeed, λ m is about 2κ, because m is a key for the message authentication code with security κ. Furthermore, 1/ρ is under 54, because the code of Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] has rate at least 1/27, and balancing the codeword increases its length by a factor of at most 2. So λ c is about 108κ, and τ = 4(κ+2) λ c e A + 1 is about 9 for e A obtained from Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] . So, using the codes from Schulman and Zuckerman [1999] , the constraint becomes κ ≥ 4 + 9 + log 2 (108κ + 1), or κ ≥ 25; better error-correcting codes for edit distance will lower this constraint.
to Alice and Bob which depend on x, thus making this approach insecure. To address this issue, the protocol of Renner and Wolf [2003] (and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] which is a modification of the former), requires a few additional steps. Alice uses this extracted key to then authenticate (using an information-theoretic one-time MAC), a fresh extractor seed. The key extracted from this seed becomes the final key which they agree upon. It is important to note that these addition steps all contribute to an entropy loss of only O(κ). (See Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] for further details.) This results in a total entropy loss that remains linear in the security parameter.
The rest of the article will focus on proving Theorem 4.1. Here, we present our improved authentication protocol. We present the proof of security and entropy loss for our authentication protocol in Section 5.
Improved Authentication Protocol. We start with the authentication protocol described in Section 3.3 and decrease the length of the extractor output in each round to be the constant τ defined in the statement of Theorem 4.1 (instead of κ + 1). This gives us an (λ m ) entropy loss for the authentication protocol as desired. Unfortunately, the security of this protocol no longer holds. The security proof in Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] shows that in order to get Bob to accept any message m = m, Eve must respond to at least one fresh random challenge from either Alice or Bob. The probability with which Eve could respond to a fresh random challenge from either Alice or Bob is 2 −τ +1 , which is not low enough if τ is a constant.
To rectify this problem, we ensure that in order to make Bob accept a different message, Eve must respond to many (namely, (κ)) fresh random challenges, which translates into a success probability of only 2 −κ as desired. To do so, we have Alice transmit the message c = Edit(m) (see Definition 3.4) and Bob verify that c is a valid codeword (or, equivalently, since we do not require that codeword validity be efficiently verifiable, Alice can send m to Bob in the clear and Bob can re-encode it to check if he gets c).
We now describe the authentication protocol precisely. Let the message that Alice wishes to authenticate be m ∈ {0, 1} λ m .
Protocol NewAuth(w, m). Intuition. The key to our improvement is to show that protocol Auth gives Eve an edit channel in the following sense. We will show that the success probability of Eve in changing the message c to a message c is exponential in the edit distance between these two messages; since this distance must be greater than e A λ c for Bob to accept at the end, Eve will fail if e A λ c is high enough. Success probability also depends exponentially on τ , with higher τ giving lower success probability.
Indeed, consider what Eve can do. She can avoid delivering a message from Alice to Bob (this corresponds to deleting a bit from the c), but then she would have to respond to Alice's fresh random challenge contained in that message on her own to avoid detection; the probability of guessing a correct response to such a challenge is at most 2 −τ +1 . She can also change a message from Alice that conveys a "0" bit into a message that conveys a "1" bit, but that would require coming up with a response to Bob's challenge, which again can happen with probability at most 2 −τ +1 . If Eve attempts to do these things multiple times, the freshness of random extractor seeds (almost) guarantees independence and the joint probability of Eve succeeding in all of these events is (almost) the product of the probability of her success in each of the individual events. In addition, she can also perform actions where she does not need to reply to extractor queries on her own. Indeed, she can "insert" "0" bits by (easily) responding to Bob's challenges on her own and can also change a "1" to a "0", but since the number of 1s and the total length are fixed, she will have to pay elsewhere with deletions and changes of "0" to "1".
Final "Liveness Test". So far, our argument only gurantees that either Alice or Bob will abort. However, the robustness property of an authentication protocol (as defined in Definition 2.4), needs to ensure that with high probability Bob doesn't accept an incorrect message m b . In particular, we say that Eve wins only if (m b = m a ∧ t B = "accept ). If our protocol didn't have a final liveness test (where Bob receives a response to a random challenge from Alice), it is possible that Alice aborts and Bob doesn't detect it (i.e., t B = "accept , even when m b = m a ). Therefore, the final "liveness test" is needed to make sure that Bob detects if Alice aborts and outputs t B = "reject . (As pointed out in Footnote 1, this definition is a corrected version of the definitions which appeared in prior works such as Chandran et al. [2010] , Dodis and Wichs [2009] , and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] . Therefore, unlike in those works, we use this final liveness test to satisfy it.)
We translate this intuition into a proof in the next section.
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
In this section, we give a high-level overview of the proof of our main theorem. Namely, we show that the new authentication protocol we presented in Section 4 is a secure authentication scheme with (λ m ) entropy loss, where λ m is the length of the message being authenticated. We prove this in two broad steps. First, we show that the authentication protocol gives Eve an edit distance channel in the following sense: Eve can modify several bits of the message that Alice authenticates to Bob. Second, we argue irrespective of what algorithm Eve uses or what modifications she does, the likely edit distance between the two messages can be bounded in terms of the security parameter, because the more bits Eve modifies, the less likely she is to be to able to answer all the required challenges successfully. As long as the code, we use can detect changes up to this distance, Eve will fail.
Technical Challenges. As mentioned before, the security proofs of Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] rely on showing that for Eve to modify the message that Alice sent, she would have to respond to at least one fresh random challenge on her own. The proofs use induction on the length of the message received by Bob so far and show that, at any stage, either Eve has responded to a random challenge on her own or the string received by Bob is essentially the same as what Alice had sent.
We, on the other hand, cannot use such an inductive proof on the length of the message for the following reason. The statement we want to make is not about whether Eve responded to a random challenge on her own or not. Instead, we would want to keep track of how many random challenges Eve responded to and precisely study the effects of responding to these challenges on the edit distance of the messages. Since the entire protocol is just an interleaving of challenges and responses sent back and forth, categorizing points in the protocol where Eve responded to a fresh random challenge on her own becomes a delicate task. In fact, it turns out that viewing the protocol in terms of the message received by Bob (or Alice) as was done in Renner and Wolf [2003] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009] does not capture all the information needed to categorize the points where Eve had to respond to a random challenge.
Instead, we need to use a new proof technique, in which we view the entire protocol from Eve's perspective. In fact, we represent Eve's view of any run of the authentication protocol by a string E. This string will allow us to capture all the information including the order in which Eve interacted with the honest parties. This turns out be crucial in categorizing points in the protocol in which Eve had to respond to a random challenge. Once we do this, we use combinatorial arguments to relate the number of random challenges that Eve responded to on her own to the edit distance between the messages of the honest parties. Finally, we compute the probability with which Eve can respond to all the fresh random challenges so that neither Alice nor Bob rejects (the last-round liveness test ensures that if Alice rejects, then Bob does, too).
Organization. In Section 5.1, we will introduce the notation for the string representation E of the protocol from Eve's point of view. Using that notation, in Section 5.3.1, we will characterize the points in the protocol (corresponding to literals in the string E) where Eve must respond to a fresh random challenge. We call these points as costly literals. Now, if we could compute the probability with which Eve can respond to every fresh random challenge, and relate the number of costly literals in E to the edit distance between the two messages c and c , then we will be done. We do precisely this. In Section 5.3.2, we present the details of relating the edit distance between c and c to the number of costly literals in the string E, showing that a high edit distance (required by the edit distance codes if c = c , because Bob verifies that c is a codeword) implies a high number of costly literals in E. Finally, we compute the probability with which Eve can respond to all fresh random challenges (which correspond to the costly literals in E) in Section 5.3.3.
Notation. Let A be an alphabet. Let a ∈ A be a literal from the alphabet. When we write a * , we mean all strings of the form aa · · · a i , where i ≥ 0 is an integer. When i ≥ 1, we write a + . Let x 1 and x 2 denote any two strings. We write x 1 ||x 2 to denote the concatenation of the two strings.
String Representation of the Authentication Protocol
We now present our proof ideas in more detail. As mentioned previously, we view the entire protocol as it takes place from Eve's perspective. Alice and Bob no longer communicate with each other; they always communicate with Eve. (For example, if Alice sends a message to Bob that Eve doesn't modify, we view it as Alice sending a message to Eve and Eve forwarding it on to Bob.)
At the beginning, Alice sends Eve a challenge x 1 . Subsequently, in any round i, 1 ≤ i ≤ λ c , Eve's interaction with Alice will consist of Eve sending a challenge y i and response to the challenge x i issued by Alice in the previous message (which should be equal to Ext(w; x i )-else, Alice will abort). Alice then sends Eve a response to y i (namely, (1, Ext(w; y i )) or (0, ⊥)), as well as the next challenge x i+1 . For i = λ c + 1, Eve sends Alice the response to the challenge x λ c +1 and as well as the challenge y live , a seed to Ext (·) (where Ext (.) is as defined in Theorem 4.1). We will call this two-message interaction that starts with a message from Eve to Alice and then from Alice to Eve as a roundtrip between Eve and Alice. To be more concise, we will use the literal "a" to denote this roundtrip that takes place between Eve and Alice. Note that the initial sending of x 1 by Alice is not a roundtrip and is not represented by a literal.
Let us now consider Eve's interaction with Bob. In any round 1 < i ≤ λ c , Eve's interaction with Bob starts with Eve sending a challenge x i and a response to the challenge y i−1 issued by Bob in the previous round, which should be equal to (1, Ext(w; y i−1 )) or (0, ⊥) (else, Bob will reject). Bob then sends Eve a challenge y i and a response to the challenge x i , namely, Ext(w; x i ). For i = 1, the interaction is the same, except that Eve does not provide a response in her first message, because there is no y i−1 . For i = λ c +1, the interaction is the same, except that Bob provides y live , a seed to Ext (·), instead of a seed to Ext(·). In the last round of interaction between Eve and Bob, she simply sends him a response r y live and gets nothing in response (but Eve still has to make sure the response is valid, because otherwise Bob will abort). We denote each such roundtrip between Eve and Bob by "b".
The notation a and b will be important for our proof. Note that we do not index a or b by the round i. This is because that information will largely be irrelevant to us. However, in any roundtrip with Alice, Alice is authenticating some bit (either 0 or 1) and Bob is receiving some bit (either 0 or 1). This allows us to have two different literals, a 0 and a 1 depending on which bit Alice is authenticating in that roundtrip. Likewise, we will also use b 0 and b 1 to denote Eve's roundtrips with Bob depending on which bit Bob is receving in that roundtrip. If we do not subscript the a or b literals, it means that the claim holds irrespective of the bit being authenticated.
Certain rounds of interaction deviate from the usual interactions. So we will distinguish them by using specially subscripting the corresponding a and b literals. In the first interaction between Eve and Bob, he receives just a challenge from Eve and no response to any challenge. (He also sends a challenge y i and a response r x 1 = Ext(w, x 1 ).) So we will distinguish the first interaction between Eve and Bob from subsequent interactions by denoting it as b ch . Likewise, in the last interaction between Eve and Alice, Alice replies with a long extractor response, that is, with r y live = Ext (w, y live ). We will denote this last interaction between Eve and Alice by a long . Finally, in the last round of interaction between Eve and Bob, Bob receives only a response from Eve and no challenge (to which Bob would have to respond). So we will denote this last interaction between Eve and Bob by b re . (Note that Eve's interaction with Bob also deviates in the second-to-last round (i.e., λ c + 1) because Bob sends Eve a seed to Ext () rather to Ext; but we will not require special notation for this round.)
Using this notation, we can write out the entire protocol from Eve's point of view by simply creating a string (call it E) denoting Eve's actions. As an example, if Eve is passive and Alice is authenticating c = c 1 , c 2 ,
Note that since Eve might be active, E will not necessarily take the previously desecribed structure. Instead, E can be any interleaving of a and b literals.
As we already said, a and b literals, except b re , represent roundtrips; thus, if Eve sends a message that causes Alice or Bob to abort, the string E does not contain the corresponding literal. Moreover, even though b re is not a roundtrip, E will not contain b re if Bob rejects. Thus, the presence of a long in E indicates that Alice accepts and the presence of b re in E indicates that Bob accepts.
Observe that no matter what Eve does, her entire interaction can be represented by a string E. Indeed, all Eve can do is send challenges and extractor responses to Alice and Bob, interleaving them arbitrarily. We can assume that Alice and Bob respond instantaneously (because it only makes Eve stronger if she does not have to wait), so we do not need model a situation in which Eve has two simultaneous round trips with Alice and Bob. Therefore, we can always write down the string E by looking at one roundtrip at a time from Eve's point of view. We next give a high-level outline of how to use the string E to prove that Protocol NewAuth is secure.
Outline of the Proof
We first recall some notation. We assume that, at the start of the protocol, Alice sends Bob the message m that she wishes to authenticate. Let Bob receive m . Alice runs protocol NewAuth to authenticate the codeword, c = edit(m). c denotes the codeword received by Bob. Our ultimate goal will be use the string representation of the authentication protocol to argue that Eve s probability of attacking the authentication scheme is low. In particular, we wish to show that the event (m = m ∧ t B = "accept") occurs with a low probability.
To show this, we need to introduce the notion of a "well-formed" string representation. We call the string E "well-formed" if it ends with a long , b re . We will be able to prove that the event (m = m ∧ t B ="accept"∧E is well formed) occurs with probability of at most 2 −(κ+1) . We will also prove that the event (t B ="accept" ∧E is not well-formed) occurs with probability at most 2 −(κ+1) . It is easy to see that proving these two statements suffices to prove our main theorem by the union bound. 7
Eve's Success when E Is Well Formed
For this section, we consider only the case when E is well formed and analyze Eve s probability of success in this situation. We handle the scenario where E is not well formed in Section 5.4.2.
Let α(E) be the function that outputs the subscripts of the a literals (other than a long ) read out in order. Then, it is easy to see that α(E) represents the message that Alice thinks she sent. Likewise, if β(E) is a function that outputs the subscripts of the b literals (other than b ch and b re ) read out in order, then β(E) is simply the message received by Bob. Observe that if Eve is passive, E will take the structure described previously and α(E) = β(E) (which is consistent with the fact that Alice's and Bob's messages are equal). Note that the literals a long , b ch , b re do not form a part of the messages α(E), β(E).
Recall that we would like to use the string representation E to categorize those points in the protocol where Eve would have to respond to a fresh random challenge. This brings us to the notion of costly literals. Definition 5.1. A literal in E is costly if in the real run of the protocol (that E represents), either Eve would have to respond to a fresh random challenge (as defined 7 It is tempting to think that the union bound is not necessary and we could therefore slightly improve our parameters. Indeed, we could avoid the union bound if we bound the following conditional probabilities by 2 −κ : Pr[ m = m ∧ t B ="accept"| E is well formed] and Pr[ t B ="accept" | E is not well formed]. If Eve chooses independently of anything in the protocol whether to try for a well formed E or a not well-formed E, then we can bound these conditional probabilities in the same way as we bound the unconditional ones. However, since we allow Eve to be adaptive, she can decide whether to aim for a well-formed E depending on how the protocol proceeds: for example, she can choose to go for a not-well-formed E only in the rare cases when she can be confident of her success. Thus makes bounding the conditional probability impossible. The necessity of the union bound here is the same as in Kanukurthi and Reyzin [2009]. in Definition 3.6) on her own in the roundtrip corresponding to the literal, or Alice or Bob would abort. PROOF. We will consider each case of the claim separately.
Characterizing Costly Literals in String
(1) Indeed, consider an a-literal that is not preceeded by a b-literal. It requires Eve to respond to Alice's outstanding challenge, issued in the previous a-literal (or, for the first a-literal, to x 1 ). By definition of fresh random challenge (Definition 3.6), this challenge is fresh, because Eve did not interact with either party after receiving it, because there is no a-or b-literal between the current one and the time the challenge was issued. (2) Indeed, consider such a b 1 literal. It requires Eve to respond to Bob's outstanding challenge, issued in the previous b literal. Eve receives no extractor outputs for a 0 -literals. And, because E is well formed, a long cannot precede b 1 , Therefore, by Definition 3.6, this challenge is fresh.
Bounding Edit Distance in Terms of the Number of Costly Literals.
For this section, we can forget about the details of the protocol altogether and focus on the properties of the string E. We wish to show that a high edit distance between α(E) and β(E) cannot be achieved without a lot of costly literals. In other words, we want to show that if there are few costly literals, then the edit distance is small. We will show this by constructing a method to convert α(E) into β(E) such that the total number of edit operations (insertions and deletions) performed is no greater than some constant times the number of costly literals. We will do this in two steps.
(1) First, we will present an algorithm that converts the string E into a new string E with the following properties.
, that is, the string received by Bob.
, b re and, in particular,
The edit distance between E and E is bounded by a constant times the number of costly literals in E. (2) Finally, we show that if E and E are well-formed strings that do take the structure as above, then the edit distance between c and c is equal to the edit distance between E and E .
The next theorem and its corollary formally state and proving the relation between the edit distance and the number of costly literals in E. We will conclude this section by showing a lower bound on the number of fresh random challenges that Eve must respond to in order to succeed in modifying the message.
Let the number of costly literals in E be at most L. Then, the following theorem states that the edit distance between the message authenticated by Alice and received by Bob is at most 4L. THEOREM 5.3. Let E be a string consisting of a 0 , b 0 , a 1 , b 1 literals, as well 
PROOF. To convert E into E , we proceed as follows.
(1) We first scan E and mark what we call the edit literals in E. These edit literals are marked so that the edit distance between E and E is at most number of edit literals in E. (2) Now, we need to show that if the number of costly literals is L, then the number of edit literals is at most 4L. It will be easier to prove the above statement by categorizing edit literals into (disjoint sets of) good edit literals and bad edit literals. Our proof will be in three steps.
(a) Using notation #bad to denote the number of bad edit literals and #edit to denote the number of edit literals, we first show that #edit ≤ 2 × #bad (Lemma 5.5). (b) Next, letting #costly to denote the number of costly literals, we will show that #bad ≤ 2×#costly = 2L (Lemma 5.6). (c) Finally, combining the above two lemmas, we get #edit ≤ 4× #costly = 4L, which is the required statement.
We now proceed to give the details. We begin by explain what we do with the string once the edit literals are marked. Next, we show how to mark literals as good edit literals and bad edit literals.
Definition 5.4. Edit Literals. When a literal in E is marked as an edit literal, it corresponds to the following.
-If an a p -literal (where p ∈ {0, 1}) is marked as an edit literal, then to convert E into E , the edit a p -literal is deleted from E. -When a b p -literal (where p ∈ {0, 1}) is marked as an edit literal, then when going from E to E , an a p literal is inserted just before the b p literal.
Clearly, E can be converted to E by at most as many insertion and deletion operations as the number of edit literals, and hence the edit distance between E and E is at most number of edit literals. As we describe next, to mark the edit literals in E, we first split E into disjoint substrings and mark the edit literals in each substring.
Marking Bad/Good Edit Literals in E.
To do this, let E be written as the concatenation of k strings; that is, E = E 1 ||E 2 || · · · ||E k . Each E i consists of a contiguous sequence of one or more a literals followed by one or more b literals (except for E 1 , which may not have any a literals). For example,
Note that E is well formed, so E k always ends with a long b re .
We now describe the algorithm to mark literals in each substring E i as (good/bad) edit literals. Note that we never mark the literals a long , b ch , b re as edit literals. By inspection, after the edit literals are marked and the string is derived by deletion and insertion according to the markings, the result is E . It remains to analyze the number of edit literals.
Algorithm MarkEdits
LEMMA 5.5. #edit ≤ 2 × #bad.
PROOF. Let #good denote the number of good edit literals. Since the set of good and bad edit literals are disjoint, it holds that #edit = #good + #bad. So it suffices to show that #good ≤ #bad. It is easy to see that the only times we mark a literal as a good edit literal are in cases (b) and (d). In both cases, the good edit literal is the a-pivot; and corresponding to it there is a unique b literal (namely, the b-pivot) that is marked as bad.
LEMMA 5.6. #bad ≤ 2 × #costly.
PROOF. To prove this lemma, we will categorize our bad edit literals into bad b 0 , bad b 1 , and bad a disjoint sets of literals. To show that #bad ≤ 2 × #costly, we need to show that bad b 0 +bad b 1 +bad a ≤ 2×#costly. We will prove this in two steps. In Lemma 5.7 we will show that #bad a + #bad b 1 = #costly. Then, in Lemma 5.8, we will show that #bad b 0 ≤ #bad a + #bad b 1 .
LEMMA 5.7. #bad a + #bad b 1 = #costly.
PROOF. We will prove the lemma by proving that it holds for every substring E i defined previously.
First, consider i = 1. The substring E 1 is of the form a * b ch b * . In this case, all the a literals are marked as bad edit literals, and, indeed, they are all costly by Lemma 5.2, because none of them is preceded by a b literal. Similarly, all b 1 -literals are marked as bad edit literals, and, indeed they are all costly by Lemma 5.2, because there are no a literals between them and b-literals that precede them.
If 1 < i < k, then E i of the form a * a p b q b * (where p, q ∈ {0, 1}), then Algorithm MarkEdits marks all the a-literals except the a-pivot as a bad edit literal. And, indeed, all but one of the a-literals is costly by Lemma 5.2, because only the first is immediately preceded by a b literal. Hence, the number of bad and costly a-literals is the same. If the first b-literal in E i is b 1 , then it is marked as bad by Algorithm MarkEdits whenever there is no a 1 literal in E i , which is exactly when it is costly by Lemma 5.2. All the other b 1 literals are always marked as bad and, indeed are costly, because there are no a literals immediately preceding them.
Finally, E k of the form a * a long b re , then all a-literals but the first one are costly by Lemma 5.2, and all but the last one are marked as bad, so again the number of costly literals is equal to the number of bad ones. Consider a displaced a 0 literal. Because E is well formed, it must be immediately succeeded by an a literal, a b ch literal, or a b 1 literal. In the first two cases, it will be marked as bad. In the third case, it will be marked as bad (by Step Bc of Algorithm MarkEdits), or the following b 1 literal will be marked as bad (by step Bd of Algorithm MarkEdits).
Thus, every displaced a 0 literal is either marked as bad, or corresponds to a bad b 1 literal. Hence, the number of displaced a 0 literals is at most #bad a + #bad b 1 .
We combine Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.8 to get Lemma 5.6. From Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.5, we obtain Theorem 5.3. Theorem 5.3 states if E has at most L costly literals, then the edit distance between E and E is at most 4L. Ultimately, we need a bound on the edit distance between α(E) and β(E). We show it in the following corollary. PROOF. The procedure described in Theorem 5.3 transforms E into E by using insert and delete operations only on the a literals, leaving b literals untouched. PROOF. Since Bob accepts, it must be that c is a valid codeword, which means that Bob received the same length string with the same number of zeros and ones as Alice sent (because the edit distance code Edit contains only fixed-length, fixed-Hammingweight strings). Therefore, E satisfies the conditions of Corollary 5.9. Assume that Eve responded to fewer than e A λ c /4 fresh random challenges. Then, by Definiton 5.1, E has fewer than e A λ c /4 costly literals, and thus by Corollary 5.9, the edit distance α(E) and β(E) is less than e A λ c . But α(E) and β(E) are distinct valid codewords, which contradicts the properties of the edit distance code from Definition 3.4.
Relating the Number of Fresh Random Challenge Responses to the Probability of Eve's
Success. So far, we have shown that the edit distance between the message authenticated by Alice and received by Bob gives us a lower bound on the number of fresh random challenges (or extractor seeds) that Eve needs to respond to (with extractor outputs) on her own. In this section, our goal will be to get an upper bound on the probability with which she can succeed in responding to all of those random challenges. Note that she needs to respond to all of them correctly so that neither Alice nor Bob abort the protocol, because if Alice aborts, then the last-round liveness test will ensure that Bob aborts, too, as we will show in Section 5.4.2.
Observe that in each round of Protocol NewAuth, Eve receives a fresh random challenge (i.e., an extractor seed) from one of the honest parties (say Alice). Eve can see the seed and then decide whether she wants to respond with a guess for the extractor output on her own or whether she wants to talk to Bob first (she can send Bob the same seed or modify it). She has this freedom even if she knows in advance the modifications she wants to make to the message being authenticated. Indeed, consider, for example, a portion of the protocol where Alice is authenticating a sequence of 0s to Bob. Suppose that Eve would like to delete one of these 0s. In this case, it doesn't matter to her which 0 she is deleting and, therefore, which challenge she choses to respond to. She could first see the challenge seed and respond to it on her own only if the entropy of the extractor conditioned on that specific seed is lower than the average entropy of an extractor output. This leads us to a subtle concern that we need to address: even though Lemma 3.2 guarantees that the entropy of an extractor output is high on average, Eve could improve her chances by adaptively choosing which extractor seed she wishes to respond to. We handle this issue by resorting to Lemma 3.3 which bounds the probability with which an extractor output evaluated on a randomly chosen seed has entropy less than τ − 1. We use this lemma to first bound the probability that Eve will receive even one extractor seed (in the entire run of Protocol NewAuth) for which the output entropy is less than τ − 1.
Once this event doesn't happen (and, therefore, the entire protocol doesn't contain a single bad seed), we know that the extractor outputs have high entropy. We now give a high-level overview of how to bound the probability with which Eve succeeds in responding to multiple random challenges assuming that there are no bad seeds. Since the extractor output is τ bits long, Eve succeeds in responding to a single random challenge with probability at most 2 −(τ −1) . Then, we would expect that the probability that Eve responds to μ fresh random challenges (chosen independently) would be at most 2 −μ(τ −1) . Unfortunately, for reasons explained after the proof of the next lemma, that's not quite the case, but we can get something close: we show that the probability that Eve responds to μ fresh random challenges on her own is 2 −μ(τ −1) + 2 −κ−3 , if the average min-entropy of w at the last extraction is at least t + 2κ (where, recall, t is the entropy needed for the extractor to work).
We now proceed with the formal argument. Consider a run of Protocol NewAuth, excluding the last message r y live from Alice to Bob. We know that Eve receives one extractor seed (challenge) in each round of interaction with an honest party. Among all the extractor seeds she receives, we denote the random challenges to which she chooses to respond on her own (rather than by first talking to the other party) by z 1 , · · · , z μ . Let S j = 1 if Eve's response to z j is correct, and 0 otherwise. Note that if S j = 0, then Alice or Bob (whoever sent z j ) will abort. Once both parties abort, there are no more random challenges, so μ may be smaller or larger depending on how successful Eve is. For ease of notation, let S j =⊥ for j > μ. Let Tr denote all the messages Eve receives from Alice and Bob, up to, but not including, r y live (if Alice or Bob aborts before r y live is sent, then Tr includes information about when the abort happens). We now prove the following lemma. PROOF. Let Tr i be the first i messages in Tr (if both parties abort before sending i messages, then Tr i is undefined). Note that
Then, the complementḠ i is the event that the entropy loss due to the protocol communication is greater than the expected value by at least 2κ bits. By Lemma 2.2,Ḡ i happens with probability at most 2 −2κ .
Let H i be the event that the random challenge z issued in the ith message is such that H ∞ (Ext(W; z) | Tr i ) ≥ τ − 1. If G i holds, then W has sufficient entropy conditioned on Tr i and z is uniform (because G i does not bias z, it only potentially biases challenges before z, since responses to them are in Tr i ). Hence, we can apply Lemma 3.3 with = τ and ε = 2 −2κ to get that Pr[
For ease of notation, for i greater than the number of messages in Tr, define H i and G i to be always true. Let G be i (G i ∩ H i ) . That is, G is the event that Tr is such that H ∞ (W | Tr) ≥ t, and, for every random challenge in Tr, the extractor response conditioned on the transcript-so-far has entropy at least τ −1. Thus, for each j, Pr[ S j = 1 | G] ≤ 2 −τ −1 , because Eve has to guess a value with entropy at least τ − 1.
Because Alice and Bob issue at most 2λ c + 1 challenges (not including y live ), the probability that G does not hold is Pr[Ḡ] ≤ (2λ c + 1)(2 τ −2κ + 2 −2κ ) by the union bound. By the constraint on κ in the statement of Theorem 4.1, we know that
Therefore,
The last inequality holds because the transcript, by definition, includes information on whether Alice and Bob abort, and therefore, information on whether each S j is 0, 1, or ⊥. Therefore, adding the values of S 1 , . . . , S j−1 to the condition does not change the fact that the answer to the challenge z j has entropy at least τ − 1, because we are still conditioning on nothing more than a transcript from G.
Need for Extra Buffer of 2κ Entropic Bits. In this proof, it may seem unclear why we need to impose a restriction on the starting entropy being 2κ bits greater than needed by simple average-entropy arguments. On an intuitive level, it might seem that since there is guarantee on the average entropy of w, and because the challenges are all chosen independently of each other, we should be able to say that (on average) probability of success in responding to each of the challenges should just be independent. It seems intuitive that we should just be able to multiply the probability that each S j = 1 directly instead of having to condition on sufficient entropy.
Unfortunately, this intuition seems wrong. Average entropy gives us a guarantee that, on average, the transcript doesn't reveal too much information about w. But we are conditioning not on the average case, but on Eve's success. So consider the case where the first challenge is particularly lucky (for Eve), so that that it reveals all information about w if S 1 = 1. Now, while the probability of this happening is very small, it still destroys independence properties because, conditioned on this event, S 2 = S 3 = · · · = S μ = 1 with probability 1.
One might be tempted to think that one can bypass such issues by simply adding together the average entropy of each response that Eve needs to give, and considering the average entropy of the entire set of responses. But this approach also doesn't seem to work. For instance, consider the seemingly intuitive statement: "if H ∞ (A) ≥ m 1 and
This statement is false (to see a counterexample, let (A, B) equal (0, 0) and (0, 1) with probability 1/8 each and (1, 1) with probability 7/8). Thus, even though we can bound the entropy of Eve's first response and the average entropy of Eve's second response given the first, we cannot simply use those bounds to obtain the entropy of the joint distribution of the two responses.
It is for this reason that we need to take the approach of considering three cases: the case of a transcript that reveals too much, the case of a transcript that has weak seeds, and the case when neither of these happens. The first two cases occur with low probability, and in the third case, we have something close to independence of extractor responses.
Putting It All Together
In this section, we combine these results to give the proof of our main result (Theorem 4.1).
Correctness. The correctness of the protocol follows from the correctness of Auth(w, c): if both parties follow the rules and Eve doesn't interfere, then neither party will reject and the correct m is sent across in the very first message from Alice to Bob.
Entropy Loss. To calculate the entropy loss, note that Alice sends at most λ c − 1 extractor responses (because at least one bit of c must be 0, because all codewords have the same Hamming weight) of length τ plus the last extractor response of length κ + τ + λ c + 4; and Bob sends λ c + 1 extractor responses of length τ . Alice and Bob also send extractor seeds, which are uniformly random; let λ r a and λ r b be the total bitlength of all these seeds for Alice and Bob, respectively. For ease of analysis, assume that Alice and Bob send all the random bits regardless of whether they abort the protocol (for instance, they send all their remaining random bits when they abort)-clearly, this does not increase the entropy loss. Then, regardless of Eve, the pair (sent a , t A ) can be written down as a string of length at most (λ c − 1)τ + κ + τ + λ c + λ r a + 4 bits (it suffices to write down everything Alice sends; if it is full length, then t A = 1, else t A = 0). Because the number of bit strings of length at most α is less than 2 α+1 (notice that using "at most" instead of "exactly" allows us to handle the case of active Eve, who gets information from observing where in the protocol abort happened), the number of possible such pairs (sent A , t A ) is at most 2 (λ c −1)τ +κ+τ +λ c +λ ra +5 . Similarly, the pair (sent b , t B ) can be written down as a string of length at most (λ c + 1)τ + 1 (here, t B cannot be inferred from the string length, hence the +1), and thus has at most 2 (λ c +1)τ +2 values. Hence, (sent a , sent b , t A , t B ) has at most 2 2λ c τ +κ+τ +λ c +λ ra +λ r b +7 values. Also, because this variable contains λ r a + λ r b independent uniform bits,
We can now apply Lemma 2.1 to get that the entropy loss is at most 2λ c τ + κ + τ + λ c + 7.
Robustness. We now move on to robustness. There are two ways for Eve to succeed in the security game, and we consider them in order to show that each one can happen with probability at most 2 −κ−1 , giving us robustness 2 −κ by the union bound (see Section 5.2).
Bounding Probability of Successful Message
Change when E Is Well Formed. By Corollary 5.10, when E is well formed, Eve must respond to at least μ = e A λ c 4 fresh random challenges in order to make sure that neither Alice nor Bob aborts. By definition of "well formed" in Section 5.2, she must do so before receiving r y live .
In order to apply Lemma 5.11, it suffices to ensure H ∞ (W | Tr) ≥ 2κ + t, where Tr is the transcript until just before r y live is sent. We can apply the same reasoning as the entropy loss analysis mentioned previously, except omitting the length κ + τ + λ c + 4 of r y live and replacing it with a single bit indicating whether Alice accepts in the last round. Thus,
The setting of minimum H ∞ (W) in Theorem 4.1 ensures that this value is at least 2κ + t.
Applying Lemma 5.11, we see that Eve will succeed with probability at most 2 −μ(τ −1) +2 −κ−3 , where μ ≥ e A λ c 4 . Because we have τ =
4(κ+2)
λ c e A +1, we get the probability of Eve's success with a well-formed E is at most 2 −κ−1 .
Bounding Eve's Success Probability when E Is not Well Formed.
To complete the proof, all that is left is to show that the probability that Eve is successful and E is not well formed is at most 2 −κ−1 . As we indicated in Section 5.2, we will show that when E is not well formed, getting Bob to accept will itself be an unlikely event for Eve. Recall that E is not well formed if it doesn't end with a long b re . As we did in Section 5.3.2, we let E be written as the concatenation of k strings; that is, E = E 1 ||E 2 || · · · ||E k where each E i is of the form a * b * . If Bob accepts, then b re is the last b-literal in E. Consider the substring E j which contains the literal b re . (Clearly, j can only be k or k − 1; if j = k − 1, E k contains only the a literals). We consider two distinct scenarios and show that the probability that Eve will succeed in either of them is at most 2 −κ−2 , giving us a total probability of success when E is not well formed of at most 2 −κ−1 (even though the scenarios are mutually exclusive, we need to use the union bound here for the reason explained in Section 5.2). Case 1. Let E j be of the form a + b + b re or a + a long b + b re . In other words, there is at least one b literal that separates the preceding a literals from b re . In this scenario, Eve needs to come up with the response contained in b re completely on her own, because she does not talk to Alice after Bob's challenge is issued. She succeeds in this with a probability of at most 2 −κ−2 by Lemma 3.2, as long as the entropy of w is at least t even conditioned on Eve's view. (This follows because if entropy is at least t, the output of Ext is of length at least κ + 3 and is at least 2 −κ−3 -close to uniform.) And the entropy conditioned on Eve's view is at least t by Lemma 2.1, because the entropy loss of the protocol, analyzed previously, is at most (2τ + 1)λ c + κ + τ + 7, and h W is set to exceed it by at least t in the statement of Theorem 4.1.
Case 2. Let E j be of the form a + b re (where a + is a substring of a 0 and a 1 literals; it cannot end with a long as the string would be well formed otherwise). This scenario arises if Eve can get Bob to think that the protocol is already on its last round and have him send the liveness test challenge y live . Even though Alice has not yet reached the last round, Eve can then issue multiple challenges y i to Alice for rounds i <= λ c in order to get responses r y i that are correlated with the response she needs to guess, r y live . In other words, by the time Eve responds to Bob, his challenge y live is no longer fresh.
Fortunately for us, each time Eve issues a challenge y i to Alice, she also has to provide a response r x i to Alice's previous challenge, and she can't get Bob's help with that, because Bob already thinks he is on the last round. Thus, in order to gain τ bits of information about r y live via y i , Eve has to pay with a guess for r x i , which is τ bits long (it's important to note one exception: the first guess r x i is not on a fresh random challenge x i , because there was a response from Bob-namely, r x λc+1 -after the challenge x i was issued). If this guess is ever incorrect, Alice will abort, and at that point Eve will have to produce y live on her own, using all the information she has gathered from Alice's responses.
To make this reasoning more precise, we will consider average min-entropy of r y live conditioned on the challenge y live . We will assume, for ease of reasoning, that Alice's challenges x i are all preselected at the beginning of the protocol, and merely revealed in the correct round. Let Tr be the random variable denoting the entire view of Eve until the moment Bob sends y live , and also include in Tr all the x i challenges from Alice and correct responses Ext(w; x i ), even those not yet seen by Eve. Define event G the same way it is defined in Lemma 5.11. Condition on G. Then, because G holds, W has sufficient min-entropy for Ext to work in the last round. Thus, by Lemma 3.2, the average min-entropy of r y live conditioned on a uniformly random y live and Tr is at least κ + 3 + τ + λ c .
Assume that at the time when Bob issued this challenge, Alice had sent j messages. Then, the game Eve is playing is the following: she has to guess the variable r y live of average min-entropy at least κ + 3 + τ + λ c by Lemma 3.2. Eve may be able to reduce this average min-entropy by at most τ by receiving r x j of length τ (see Lemma 2.1). Given no other information, the probability with which Eve guesses this is at most 2 −(κ+3+τ +λ)+τ . However, Eve may be able to learn more information and decrease the entropy of r y live . In particular, she may further be able to decrease it by τ each time she guesses an unrelated variable of min-entropy τ − 1 (namely, the value r x i for j < i ≤ λ c ), and receives r y i of length τ . 8 In other words, Eve may reduce the entropy of r y live by τ with probability 2 −(τ −1) , by 2τ with a probability of 2 −2(τ −1) , and so on.
Therefore, Eve's probability of success, conditioned on G, is thus 2 −(κ+3+τ +λ c )+τ (2 −(τ −1) 2 τ + 2 −2(τ −1) 2 2τ + · · · + 2 −(λ c −1)(τ −1) 2 (λ c −1)τ ) ≤ 2 −κ−3 . (The additive terms, within the parenthesis, capture the amount of information Eve may learn by initiating challenge-response games with Alice after Bob sends y live . The more such rounds Eve plays with Alice, the more information she learns. However, the probability with which she learns this information reduces as she needs to respond to more random challenges as well.) Furthermore, Pr[Ḡ] ≤ 2 −κ−3 (see proof of Lemma 5.11 and note that the condition required for that Lemma, namely that H ∞ (w | Tr) ≥ 2κ +t, holds by the same reasoning as in Section 5.4.1, since Tr contains the same information). We thus get that the overall probability of success in case 2 is bounded by 2 −κ−2 .
CONCLUSIONS AND SUBSEQUENT WORK
We have presented a protocol that allows two parties sharing a low entropy secret to extract a shared key of optimal length-if the shared secret has entropy m, then the length of the extracted key is m − (κ), where κ is the security parameter. We obtain our result through a somewhat unexpected application of edit distance codes. While our protocol has optimal entropy loss, it has a round complexity of (κ). On the other hand, Dodis and Wichs [2009] showed nonconstructively, through the use of nonmalleable extractors, that there exists a protocol with both optimal entropy loss and optimal round complexity (2 rounds, which is shown to be necessary by Dodis and Wichs [2009] ). Until recently, the problem of finding a polynomial-time protocol with optimal round complexity and optimal entropy loss was open. Li [2012b] made progress on the open problem by showing two-round protocol for w whose entropy rate is an arbitrary constant; his work was using explicit constructions of nonmalleable extractors and novel protocol techniques shown in Dodis et al. [2011] , Cohen et al. [2011] , and Li [2012a] (which achieve optimal entropy loss when the entropy rate of w is at least 1/2). In other related work, the work of Bouman and Fehr [2011] studies the reusability of authentication schemes by using (unlike in our work) one-time sessions derived from weak long-term keys for authentication. In this setting, in order to ensure re-usability, it is essential to guarantee privacy of the long-term key.
